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Abstract: Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985) showed in a standard 
neoclassical growth model that taxing capital income cannot be optimal in 
the long-run. This  conclusion has been challenged on various grounds. In 
particular, I will focus on the critical contribution by Aghion et al. (2013), 
who analyze the optimal use of labour and capital income taxes within a 
Schumpeterian growth model. By introducing innovation-led growth, they 
find that a zero tax rate on capital income may become suboptimal due to a 
market size effect. More specifically, the higher the level of public 
expenditure, the more should capital income be taxed. In fact, not taxing 
capital income means that labour income must be taxed at a higher rate. 
This, in turn, has a detrimental effect on labour supply and, thereby, on the 
market size for innovation. Also taxing capital income reduces innovation 
incentives. However, for sufficiently high public spending, the former 
effect dominates. The main limitation of the Schumpeterian analysis is 
that, by assuming a single representative agent, it ignores the effects of 
personal income distribution.  
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«In this world nothing is certain but death and taxes.» 
Benjamin Franklin 
 
INTRODUCTION  
«The state, or to be more exact, the government cannot do anything for its citizens if the 
citizens are not doing anything for the state», mentioned N. Turguenev in his book "The 
Experience of the Taxation Theory". Taxes have a central role in the system of state 
revenues. In all countries, taxes constitute 80%-90% of the state budget. In particular, 
large countries tend to raise much of their revenue by taxing income. 
The crucial problem is to delineate an appropriate distribution of the tax burden. In fact, 
as Piketty (2014) points out, «Taxation is not a technical matter. It is preeminently a 
political and philosophical issue, perhaps the most important of all political issues». 
In designing a tax system, the state will generally have two goals. On the one hand, it will 
aim to implement the policy with the minimum loss to society. The use of policy will 
cause a loss due to the resources used in the implementation process and to the economic 
distortions induced by the policy. Minimizing this loss is the efficiency aspect of policy 
design. On the other hand, the state may also feel that it is desirable to intervene in the 
economy in order to attain a more equitable distribution of the economy's resources. This 
is often accompanied by a corresponding reduction in the degree of concern for the 
aggregate level of economic activity. This motivation represents the equity concern of 
policy design. 
Due to their distinct natures, it is inevitable that the goals of equity and efficiency 
regularly conflict. It is often the case that the efficient policy is highly inequitable whilst 
the equitable policy would introduce into the economy significant distortions and 
disincentives. Given this fact, the design of optimal policy can be seen as the process of 
reaching the correct trade-off between equity and efficiency objectives. This optimal 
trade-off will depend upon the concern for equity that is expressed in the objectives of the 
INTRODUCTION 
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policy maker. In many policy analyses, the resolution of the trade-off between equity and 
efficiency is the major determinant of the resulting policy program. 
The recent US history of tax policy shows how political leaders differ in their views on 
equity and efficiency. When Ronald Regan was elected president in 1980 the marginal 
tax rate on the earnings of the richest Americans was 50%. Reagan argued that such high 
tax rates greatly distorted economic incentives to work and save. In other words, he 
claimed that these high tax rates cost too much in terms of economic efficiency. Reagan, 
therefore, signed into law large cuts in tax rates in 1981, and then again in 1986. When 
Reagan left office in 1989, the richest Americans faced a marginal tax rate of only 28%.  
The pendulum of political debate swings both ways. When Bill Clinton ran for president 
in 1992, he argued that the rich were not paying their fair share of taxes. In other words, 
the low tax rates on the rich violated his view of vertical equity. In 1993, President 
Clinton signed into law a bill that raised the tax rates on the richest Americans to about 
40%. When George W. Bush ran for president, he reprised many of Reagan's themes and 
as president he reversed part of the Clinton tax increase, reducing the highest tax rate to 
35%. Barack Obama pledged during the 2008 presidential campaign that he would raise 
taxes on high-income households and starting in 2013 the top marginal tax rate was back 
at about 40%.  
As Okun (1975) memorably put it, taxing the better off to finance transfers to the worse-
off is like "carrying water in a leaky bucket". Different philosophies of distributive justice 
lead to different conclusions about how much of a leak we should be willing to accept 
before we stop carrying further buckets. The economic literature on "optimal income 
taxation" provides a systematic way of thinking about this problem, by positing that the 
structure of tax revenues should be chosen so as to maximize a social welfare function 
subject to a set of constraint. 
The main contributions of the optimal income tax literature are briefly reviewed in 
chapter 1. Chapter 2 focuses on the basic result of no capital income taxation developed 
within a standard neoclassical growth model. Although such a result can be extended in a 
variety of settings, it has little empirical support. Hence, a number of alternatives to the  
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zero capital income taxation conclusion has been identified. Chapters 3 and 4 present in 
detail a Schumpeterian growth model and its key implications for capital and labour 
income taxation. Some of the findings obtained by introducing innovation-led growth 
seem to be confirmed in specific empirical cases, as illustrated in chapter 5. However, 
chapter 6 sheds light on the fact that the Schumpeterian model still suffers important 
limitations in the understanding of actual tax dynamics. 
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CHAPTER 1 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The optimal income tax literature is vast. One of the oldest and most important questions 
it dealt with is: how should the tax burden be split among workers and capitalists? what is 
the optimal combination of labour and capital income taxes? should capital income be 
taxed? 
 
1.1 Zero Optimal Capital Income Taxation 
The cornerstone in this debate is provided by the work of Chamley (1986) and Judd 
(1985). They analyze the optimal use of taxes on labor income and capital income to 
finance an exogenous stream of government purchases in a Ramsey framework with 
capital accumulation and infinitely-lived households sharing the same intertemporal 
utility function. The celebrated result is that, in the long run, the optimal tax rate on 
capital income is zero. One way to get intuition of this result is to note that taxing capital 
income in period t+1 is equivalent to taxing consumption at a higher rate in period t+1 
than in period t. Thus, a positive tax on capital income in a steady state is equivalent to an 
ever-increasing tax on consumption. Such an increasing tax cannot be optimal in a steady 
state because all of the relevant general equilibrium expenditure elasticities are constant 
over time. 
The Chamley-Judd finding has been reconfirmed in a variety of settings: 
 standard neoclassical growth model with exogenous technical progress (Aghion et 
al., 2013) 
 standard neoclassical growth model with heterogenous agents (Judd, 1985) 
 standard neoclassical growth model with indivisible labour supply (Basu and 
Renström, 2002) 
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 endogenous growth model with human capital (Lucas, 1990) 
 small open economy with perfectly mobile capital (Razin and Sadka, 1991) 
 overlapping-generations economy with social welfare function of the Koopmas 
form (Renström, 2000) 
 
 
1.2 Empirical Evidence 
Do actual capital tax rates over the last several decades reflect the Chamley-Judd 
conclusion on optimal capital income taxation? 
The most consistent data on the taxation of the return to capital in developed countries 
are the OECD’s data on statutory corporate income taxation (OECD, 2008). These data 
show that statutory corporate tax rates fell sharply in the late 1980s from levels in the 
range of 45-50% and have continued a steady decline since then, falling to an average of 
below 30% by 2007. From 1985 to 1990, in particular, several major economies 
substantially cut their corporate tax rates: the United States from 50% to 39%; the United 
Kingdom from 40% to 33%; Australia from 46% to 39%; Germany from 60% to 55%; 
and France from 50% to 42%. In 2007, the average corporate tax rate in the OECD was 
approximately 28%. The lowest rate was in Ireland, at 12.5%. Taxation of capital income 
also occurs at the personal level in most OECD countries. The unweighted average 
OECD personal income tax rate on dividend income has plunged from 55% in the early 
1980s to below 30% in 1991 and below 20% by 2005. In fact, in 2007 three OECD 
countries had zero personal tax rates on dividend income: Greece, Mexico, and the 
Slovak Republic.  
Similar trends in capital income taxation can also be identified in Table 1, which presents 
the development of the statutory tax rates on the three forms of capital income- both at 
the individual and corporate level- in the EU countries from 1990 to 2000 and 2003. 
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Source: CESifo DICE Database 
 
 
From 1990 to 2003, in most EU countries the tax rates have been cut. This can be seen 
from the average rates most of which are considerably lower in 2003 than they have been 
in 1990 or 2000. A specifically strong reduction from 2000 to 2003 has happened with 
the personal tax rates on interest and dividends. 
Although tax rates on capital income have fallen, a large gap remains between theory and 
policy: in fact, actual tax rates are generally far from zero, the level recommended by 
standard optimal tax models. 
  
Table 1: Capital income tax rates in EU countries, 1990,2000,2003 
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1.3 Non-zero Optimal Capital Income Taxation 
How can we explain such a gap between theory and practice? A number of theoretical 
arguments relating to both concerns for efficiency and equity has been established: 
 
 1.3.1 Imperfect Competition 
 A key feature of modern dynamic economies is imperfect competition. Some imperfect 
competition is due to institutions such as patents and copyrights that allow firms to 
exercise market power over the sale of products they have invented. Some imperfect 
competition is due to various forms of increasing returns and product differentiation.  
Judd (1997) develops an infinitely-lived representative agent model, where there is a 
fixed number of goods, each of which is produced by a monopolistically competitive 
firm, is consumed, and is employed to create a differentiated capital input used in the 
production of all goods. Within such a framework, the long-run optimal choice for the tax 
rate on capital income is given by: 
 
  
    
       
     
   
  
where:  = markup of price over marginal cost 
              = tax rate on pure profits 
             = marginal excess burden of taxation 
When all pure profits are taxed away or the marginal efficiency cost of taxation is zero, 
then   
  is a subsidy that completely neutralizes the monopolistic price distortion. These 
special cases are not realistic (lump-sum taxes are generally not available and agents are 
likely to react to confiscatory profit tax rates), but the results are similar when we assume  
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plausible values for  ,    and    . The basic intuition works as follows. Market 
imperfections act like a privately imposed tax on purchasers of intermediate goods. If 
there are sufficient tax instruments, then a subsidy to capital reduces the investment 
distortions due to markups. 
 
 1.3.2 Borrowing Constraints 
Many households face binding liquidity constraints. Capital markets may fail to provide 
loans due to asymmetric information between financiers and borrowers, which results in 
moral hazard and adverse selection. Moreover, labour earnings cannot be used as 
collateral in financial contracts, since modern states have abolished slavery. 
Aiyagari (1995) constructs an infinite-horizon economy in which a continuum of agents 
derives value from public expenditures and faces possible borrowing constraints due to 
uninsurable idiosyncratic income shocks. For this type of environment, the optimal tax 
rate on capital income is positive even in the long-run. Intuitively, borrowing constraints 
result in inefficiently high levels of saving and, thereby, over-accumulation of capital. In 
other words, with binding borrowing constraints the relative price of future consumption 
in terms of current consumption is lower than the marginal rate of transformation 
between future and current consumption. A positive tax on capital income reduces the 
incentives to save of those who are not borrowing constrained. By redistributing the 
proceeds of the capital income tax, the credit constraints for those who cannot borrow are 
alleviated. Capital income taxes thus help to complete the missing market for borrowing 
by transferring resources from those who can to those who cannot borrow. 
 
 1.3.3 Productive Public Spending 
Growing empirical evidence suggests that higher government spending is not negatively 
correlated with the growth rate. A simple way to interpret such results is to observe that  
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the paradigm of government spending as useless and unproductive consumption of 
economic resources is naive and imprecise. Actually, many forms of public spending 
affect directly or indirectly the productivity of the economy.  
Corsetti and Roubini (1996) consider an endogenous growth model with a separate 
human capital accumulation sector and productive public spending. The government 
activity imposes a positive externality on production since it increases the productivity of 
private inputs. Hence, the private rate of return comes to exceed the social rate of return. 
To correct this externality, the involved pure rents have to be taxed away. If the pure 
rents induced by the public good are accrued entirely by capital, a  capital income tax can 
be used to reach the first-best allocation.   
 
 1.3.4 Self-Interest and Lack of Commitment 
In practice, taxes are not set by benevolent governments, but by politicians who have 
objectives different from those of citizens. Moreover, politicians are typically unable to 
commit to complete sequences of future taxes.  
Acemoglu et al. (2011) introduce into the standard neoclassical growth model the 
assumption that taxes are the outcome of a dynamic game between politicians and 
citizens: while politicians have the power to set taxes, they are potentially controlled by 
the citizens, who can remove them from power using elections or other means. Politicians 
are likely to be more impatient than citizens: corruption, wars, financial crises, etc., are 
all exogenous reasons for which politicians tend to be short-sighted. If this is in fact the 
case, then the best subgame perfect equilibrium from the viewpoint of the citizens 
involves positive long-run capital income taxes. The reason is that, when politicians are 
less patient than citizens, the political sustainability constraint remains binding even 
asymptotically. This rises the marginal cost of saving because any increase in output 
must now also be accompanied with greater payments to politicians in order to provide 
them with the appropriate incentives. A positive capital income tax reduces the capital 
stock of the economy and, thereby, the rents that should be provided to politicians. 
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 1.3.5 Depreciation Allowances 
Tax codes generally allow purchasers of capital to reduce their calculated taxable income 
by some amount to reflect the cost of acquiring capital. This reduction in taxable income 
is usually implemented through a schedule of depreciation allowances, which may or 
may not be accelerated relative to the economic depreciation of the capital asset. The 
most accelerated version of depreciation allowances is immediate expensing. 
Abel (2007) extends the standard neoclassical growth model to allow for immediate 
expensing. With full expensing, the capital income tax is neutral (i.e. doesn't distort the 
optimal choice of the capital stock) and can collect a substantial amount of revenue. 
Thus, it can be used to finance government spending in a non-distortionary manner. In 
particular, provided that government purchases do not exceed gross capital income less 
gross investment, the optimal tax system consists of a positive tax rate on capital income 
and a zero tax rate on labor income. This finding turns on its head the Chamley-Judd 
prescription and involves a higher level of utility of the representative household. 
 
 1.3.6 Tradeoff between generations 
During lifetime one's educational level, working capacity, income and needs change. 
These developments are reflected in the individual labour supply and in the individual 
saving behaviour and may give rise to interesting interplays among economic agents at 
different stages in their life. 
Uhlig and Yanagawa (1996) study a fairly standard, deterministic overlapping 
generations model with endogenous growth, where the productivity-augmented labour 
input contains an externality term related to aggregate capital and government 
expenditures as well as debt financing are a fixed fraction of total GNP. If labour income 
is paid mostly to the young and capital income accrues mostly to the old, a higher capital 
income tax rate- and hence a lower labour income tax rate- means that the younger 
people in an economy are left with more income out of which to save and buy capital.  
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Since savings decisions are sufficiently inelastic with respect to long-term interest rates, 
this will result in a rise of savings and, thereby, of  the economy's capital stock. Thus, 
higher capital income taxation actually leads to faster growth. 
 
 1.3.7 Migration 
Though labour is not perfectly mobile, its mobility is increasing and a factor of growing 
importance especially for the European Union and its enlargement. Furthermore, the 
mobility of labour is not at all comparable to the mobility of capital. Since workers 
embody human capital and take the assets they own with them when moving, migration 
flows are particularly important for fiscal policies, as they substantially influence the tax 
base of an economy.  
Schuppert (1995) incorporates migration in a multi-country endogenous growth model 
where a productive local public good is subject to congestion induced by aggregate 
population. Migration gives rise to an inefficiency, as migrants do not take into account 
the congestion costs they impose. Since production employs human capital and the size 
of the labour force as a single input factor, the external effect of aggregate population 
cannot be corrected using a tax on labour income. Rather, a subsidy on human capital as 
well as a tax on physical capital are efficient to regulate migration flows and internalize 
congestion costs. The reason is that the migration decision is based on the net income 
differential between the sending country and the receiving country: in fact, while capital 
investments can be split across countries, differences in labour productivities can only be 
realized by migrating. A subsidy on human capital influences the amount of human 
capital invested in the domestic economy and, thereby, the return on the substitutive 
factor labour. Similarly, a tax on physical capital influences the stock of physical capital 
accumulated in the domestic economy and, thereby, the return on the complementary 
factor labour. 
De Bonis and Spataro (2006) address the problem of optimal inheritance and capital  
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income taxation in an overlapping generations model with altruism motivated bequests 
and migration. Migration brings about a disconnection in the economy, as altruism is 
limited only to own descendants. If the weights attached by the government to the 
individual utility functions within the social welfare function correspond to the actual 
demographic weights, the disconnection induced by migration is the underlying reason 
for nonzero optimal tax rates. In particular, the capital income tax is positive, since 
consumption of the young is weighted more heavily than consumption of the old, given 
the higher demographic weight of the former with respect to the latter. As for the 
inheritance tax, instead, this is negative: children’s consumption is favored with respect 
to their parents one, given the higher demographic weight of the young with respect to 
the old.  
 
 1.3.8 Innovation-Led Growth 
The mainspring of long-run economic growth is technological progress. This comes from 
innovations that generate new products, processes and markets. Innovations, in turn, are 
the outcome of deliberate research and development activities that arise in the course of 
market competition.  
Aghion et al. (2013) develop a Schumpeterian growth model, where productivity-
enhancing innovations result from non-verifiable profit-motivated R&D investment, 
R&D uses final good as an input and final good is produced with capital and labour. 
Their main finding is that, for a given required trend of government expenditure, taxing 
capital income at a zero rate may become suboptimal, due to a market size effect. More 
specifically, not taxing capital income implies that labour income must be taxed at a 
higher rate. This, in turn, negatively affects labour supply and, therefore, reduces 
innovation incentives. Simultaneously, taxing capital income also reduces innovation 
incentives by lowering the capital stock of the economy. However, when the required 
level of government expenditure is sufficiently high, the former effect dominates. 
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 1.3.9 Heterogeneous Endowments 
Both the personal and functional income distribution have altered substantially over time 
in all regions as a result of major crises or changes in development strategies and in the 
international economic framework. In particular, the 1980s (or in some countries the late 
1970s or the early 1990s) appears to be one of the turning points, when there was a 
sizeable increase in the personal income inequality in virtually all regions and a 
significant decline in the share of wages in many countries. 
Fiaschi (2003) examines an endogenous growth model where agents differ in their factor 
endowments, functional and personal income distribution go hand in hand and welfare 
analysis is based on the Lorenz dominance concept. The crucial result is that, for any 
uneven distribution of initial factor endowments, the fiscal regime where the tax rate on 
capital income is zero maximizes growth but does not belong to the set of socially 
optimal fiscal policies. The intuition is straightforward. A positive tax rate on capital 
income means a greater share of total income is allocated to labor. This, in turn, reduces 
the growth rate but increases consumption in the initial periods for all agents. Given an 
unequal distribution of resources, the poor agents (i.e. laborers) have such a low level of 
consumption that they benefit from trading off lower growth with higher initial levels of 
consumption. The richest agents (i.e. capitalists), instead, suffer from such a consumption 
reallocation. However, the concave form of the individual utility function always makes 
the loss of the rich agents lower than the gain of the poor agents. 
 
 1.3.10 Endogenous Fertility 
The hypothesis which puts forward exogenous population growth as inherent in the 
neoclassical models of Solow (1956), Cass (1965) and Koopmans (1965), which neglect 
interactions between the economic growth process and demographic trends, is clearly 
unsatisfactory. These models are unable to capture the observable diversity of population 
growth through the variance in the behavior of fertility and mortality rates among  
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different countries. We might make a similar observation for a single economy over time 
and around the development process. For example, it is well established that in recent 
decades several developed countries have experienced a dramatic drop in fertility.  
Spataro and Renström (2012) tackle the issue of optimal taxation in an intertemporal 
economy with endogenous fertility and critical-level utilitarianism (i.e. the objective is 
the sum of the differences between individual utilities and a constant non-negative 
critical level of utility, where the critical level is defined as a utility level α of an extra 
person that, if added to the population, would make society as well off as without that 
person). If the government is fixing a stream of  per capita public spending, the 
total expenditure will be proportional to the population size. When individual families 
decide on family sizes, they will not take into account the externality they impose on the 
government's spending side. This externality is perfectly internalized when the tax rate on the 
family size is equal to per capita public expenditure. However, provided that the first-best 
taxation is not implementable, the second-best tax structure involves also a positive tax 
on capital income and negative levels of public debt in case labour supply is exogenously 
given. The rationale is the following. When labour supply is exogenous, there are labour 
rents present. If these rents are not taxed at 100%, a capital income tax partially taxes 
them (because FLK >0). As for the negative level of debt, under the second-best it is 
optimal to run primary surpluses at the beginning of the tax programme so as to arrive at 
the steady state with public assets. At the steady state, tax receipts fall below the level of 
public expenditure, though not being zero. 
 
 1.3.11 Nonverifiable Costs in Human Capital 
Not all costs of the investment in human capital can be verified, and hence expensed, by 
the government. Direct educational expenditures on books, computers, and traveling are 
important examples of non-verifiable investments in human capital. Tuition costs cannot 
be deducted for income tax purposes in many countries either, so that these costs are also 
effectively non-verifiable. Moreover, costs of effort while enrolled in education, such as 
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studying hard, sacrificing leisure activities, and preparing exams, are important 
immaterial costs that the government cannot verify easily. 
Jacobs and Bovenberg (2010) use a two-period life-cycle model of human capital 
formation, financial savings and labour supply, where the costs of learning are not all 
verifiable to the government. In the presence of non-verifiable investments in education, 
labour income taxation discourages human capital formation and stimulates the 
accumulation of financial assets. A second-best instrument to mitigate these distortions in 
the composition of saving is provided by a positive tax on capital income, whose 
proceeds are used as an implicit subsidy on human capital. If aggregate saving is inelastic 
with respect to learning, then the optimal tax rate on capital income is relatively large 
compared to the optimal tax rate on labor income. 
 
 1.3.12 Tax Arbitrage 
In practice, it is difficult for the government to distinguish between capital income and 
labor income. It follows that  differential  treatment of the two income tax bases may well 
induce shifting:  
(1) US C-corporations vs S-corporations: shift from corporate income and realized capital 
gains toward individual business income (Gordon and Slemrod, 2000) 
(2) carried interest in the US: hedge fund and private equity fund managers receive 
fraction of profits of assets they manage for clients; those profits are really labor income 
but are taxed as realized capital gains. 
(3) Finnish dual income tax system: taxes separately capital income at preferred rates 
since 1993; Pirtila and Selin (2007) show that it induced shifting from labour income to 
capital income especially among self-employed 
Christiansen and Tuomala (2008) analyze a two-period life-cycle model where there are 
two types of agents who pay taxes only in the second period and may costly (but legally)  
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shift income from labour to capital. If capital income is not taxed, there are strong 
incentives to camouflage labour income as capital income. This produces an 
unproductive and wasteful use of economic resources as taxpayers incur a cost in the 
pursuit of tax saving. Taxing capital income is therefore necessary to avoid tax-arbitrage 
between labour and capital income tax bases and to maintain the integrity of the income-
tax system. The latter argument doesn't imply, however, that capital income should be 
taxed at the same rate as labour income. Indeed, the asymmetric information case for a 
capital income tax must be traded off against distortionary effects not only on savings, 
but also on labor supply as an agent may earn labor income which is reported and taxed 
as capital income. 
 
 1.3.13 Uncertain Future Earnings 
Risk is a factor that is evident throughout economic activity. Households purchase goods 
whose value in use is determined by the state of nature. The choice of portfolio is not the 
only uncertain decision that a typical household will have to face. It may not be unusual 
for labour supply decisions to be taken before the actual level of the wage is realized. 
This can occur in some forms of self-employment (such as farming) where production 
takes place prior to the return being realized and, even if the nominal wage is known, 
future price variation can make the real wage random. 
Jacobs and Schindler (2012) investigate a two-period life-cycle model with ex-ante 
identical households, endogenous leisure demands in both periods and general processes 
of skill shocks over the life-cycle. They demonstrate that, under risk, the optimal capital 
income tax is always non-zero. The intuition goes as follows. First of all, a capital 
income tax boosts second-period labor supply because second-period labor supply and 
saving are substitutes. Thus, taxing capital income alleviates the distortions of labour 
income taxation on labor supply (or retirement). Second, a capital income tax reduces 
first-period labour supply because first-period labour supply and saving are complements, 
but this effect is offset given that a capital income tax simultaneously contributes to  
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insure first-period income risk. Thus, taxing capital income allows also to smooth the 
dead-weight costs of social insurance over both the labor and capital tax bases. Finally, 
since both leisure demands are endogenous, a capital income tax entails an additional 
distortion in the intertemporal leisure decision, besides the saving decision. The latter 
effect tends to reduce the optimal tax rate on capital income. However, as long as second-
period labor supply increases more than first-period labor supply decreases, the optimal 
capital income tax rate always remains unambiguously positive. Empirical evidence 
suggests that this condition indeed holds. 
 
 1.3.14 Heterogeneous preferences 
Homogeneity in tastes for goods is clearly unrealistic. For example, propensities to save 
vary widely across the population and empirical studies have shown that savings rates are 
correlated with education even controlling for income. Therefore, there is a strong 
presumption that higher income individuals save more not only because they have more 
income to save but also because they might have a better financial education and be more 
aware of the need to save for retirement.  
Saez (2002) focuses on a standard overlapping generations model where individuals with 
higher abilities have a stronger preference to save. If agents with high earnings levels z 
are forced to work less and earn z'<z, they would still have a higher taste for savings and 
so save more than agents with income z'. This suggests that interest income ought to be 
taxed even in the presence of a non-linear optimal earnings tax. In fact, taxation of saving 
helps with the equity-efficiency tradeoff by being a source of indirect evidence about 
who has higher earning abilities and thus contributes to more efficient redistributive 
taxation. 
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Table 2: Summary of Optimal-Income-Tax Literature 
Judd (1997) 
neoclassical growth model with 
imperfect competition 
     
Aiyagari (1995) 
Bewley type model with borrowing 
constraints 
     
Corsetti and Roubini 
(1996) 
endogenous growth model with 
productive public good 
     
Acemoglu et al. (2011) 
neoclassical growth model with self-
interested politicians and no commitment 
     
Abel (2007) 
neoclassical growth model with 
immediate expensing 
     
Uhlig and Yanagawa 
(1996) 
OLG model where young earn labour 
income and old capital income 
     
Schuppert (1995) 
endogenous growth model with 
migration and productive public good 
     
De Bonis and Spataro 
(2006) 
OLG model with bequests and migration      
Aghion et al. (2013) Schumpeterian growth model      
Fiaschi (2003) 
endogenous growth model with 
heterogeneous endowments 
     
Spataro and Renström 
(2012) 
intertemporal economy with endogenous 
fertility and exogenous labour 
     
Jacobs and Bovenberg 
(2010) 
OLG model with non-verifiable 
investment costs in human capital 
     
Christiansen and 
Tuomala (2008) 
OLG model with income shifting      
Jacobs and Schindler 
(2012) 
OLG model with non-insurable skill 
shocks 
     
Saez (2002) 
OLG model with heterogeneous 
preferences 
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CHAPTER 2 
NEOCLASSICAL MODEL 
2.1 Household 
Consider an infinite-horizon economy in discrete time and suppose that there is a single 
representative household. At each date the household derives utility from its current 
consumption and its current leisure: 
 
         
 
where:      = instantaneous utility function 
               = consumption at date t 
               = labour supply at date t 
Assume that: 
 
         
              
              
                      
 
The household is farsighted, in the sense that it cares about not just current utility but also 
expected future utilities. However, the household is also impatient, in the sense that it 
cares more about the flow of utility expected in the near future than the flow of utility 
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expected much later. Specifically, when evaluating any lifetime plan for consumption and 
labour, it uses a weighted sum of instantaneous utilities: 
 
           
 
   
       
 
where   is the constant discount factor. 
Besides supplying labour, the household owns physical capital as well. At each date it 
rents the capital and labour services to business firms. Suppose that labour and capital 
markets are perfectly competitive and clear at each date and that the household has 
perfect foresight of all future prices. The basic constraint that the household faces at each 
date is then: 
 
                                           
 
where:    = capital stock at date t 
               = wage rate at date t 
               = rental rate of capital at date t 
                 = tax rate on capital income at date t 
                = tax rate on labour income at date t 
             = constant rate of capital depreciation 
The household chooses the sequence of consumption, labour and capital                
  
that maximizes its lifetime utility subject to its lifetime budget constraint, taking the  
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initial capital stock as given and subject to the condition that the present discounted value 
of asymptotic capital cannot be negative. As with any constrained optimization problem, 
the solution is derived by forming the Lagrangian expression: 
 
              
 
   
 
                                                 
 
   
 
 
where    is the Lagrange multiplier at date t and can be interpreted as the shadow value 
of a unit of capital in period t. 
The first-order necessary conditions are: 
 
  
   
                                  
  
     
                                              
  
   
                                             
   
   
           
 
Defining now the current shadow values as: 
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the preceding first-order conditions imply: 
 
                           
                                      
 
where: 
 
                          
                            
 
The first equation reflects the optimal choice between consumption and leisure, whereas 
the second equation (known as the Euler equation) reflects the optimal choice between 
current and future consumption. 
 
2.2 Firms 
Consider a closed economy. At each date firms rent capital and labour services from the 
representative household and produce a unique final good, which can be used for private 
consumption or for public consumption or as investment. The production possibilities set 
of each firm is represented by the Cobb-Douglas production function: 
 
     
   
          
 
where    is the output of the final good at date t. 
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Assume that the product market is competitive and choose the final good as the 
numeraire. Then, in every period, the flow of profit attained by each firm is given by: 
 
                
 
and the equilibrium prices for capital and labour are determined by: 
 
   
   
   
    
     
    
   
   
   
        
   
   
 
2.3 Government 
The government has an exogenous stream of expenses. At each date these expenditures 
are used for a purpose which does not directly affect the household's utility or the firms' 
production and are raised through linear taxes on capital and labour earnings. The budget 
constraint that the government faces in every period is then: 
 
                     
 
where:    = exogenous public expenditure at date t. 
The government chooses a sequence                        
 
 so as to maximize the overall 
welfare of the representative household subject to the aggregate production feasibility 
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requirement, the government's balanced budget constraint, the household's optimality 
conditions and the firms' determination of factor rewards. 
Using Euler's theorem, we can write the government's budget constraint also as: 
 
     
   
              
 
Moreover, feasibility imposes that the resource constraint be satisfied: 
 
  
   
                       
 
Thus, the government's maximization problem can be summarized by: 
 
   
              
 
           
 
   
 
 
subject to: 
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The Lagrangian for this problem is: 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
        
       
   
                       
       
   
                 
                           
                                         
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
and the first-order necessary conditions imply: 
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2.4 Steady State 
Suppose that the solution to the Ramsey problem converges to a steady state, i.e. all 
endogenous variables remain constant. In this case, the first-order necessary condition 
with respect to      becomes: 
 
          
                  
            
 
and the household's Euler equation becomes: 
 
           
 
Substituting the latter equation into the former, yields: 
 
               
 
Since the marginal social value of goods    is strictly positive and the marginal social 
value of reducing taxes    is nonnegative, it follows that   must equal  . Thus, we can 
conclude that: 
PROPOSITION: If there exists a steady-state Ramsey allocation, then the optimal long-
run tax rate on capital income is: 
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2.5 Intuition 
The intuition underlying the Chamley-Judd result is very simple. Assume that at the 
steady state the capital is paid a before-tax return   and its tax rate is  . Then, capital 
income taxation changes the relative price of consumption at date t and consumption at 
date       by a factor: 
 
 
   
        
 
 
 
 
If   is nonzero, this factor tends to 0 or infinity (depending on the sign of  ) when T goes 
to infinity. Thus, taxing (or subsidizing) capital would change in an explosive way the 
choice between current and future consumptions. Such an explosive response cannot be 
optimal in the steady state because all relevant expenditure elasticities are constant over 
time. It follows that the long-run tax rate on capital income should be 0. 
 
2.6 Extensions 
The no capital income tax conclusion can also be confirmed in a few other economic 
environments. 
 
 2.6.1 Exogenous Growth 
Suppose that there is a productivity parameter A in the aggregate production function 
reflecting the current state of technological knowledge and that this productivity 
parameter grows at the constant exponential rate g: 
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Then the first-order conditions for the government problem along a balanced path 
equilibrium- where     , capital and govrnment spending also grow at rate g and labour 
supply remains constant over time- imply: 
 
   
 
 
 
    
        
        
 
   
   
    
        
      
  
 
   
 
 
         
 
Combining the latter two equations yields: 
 
 
   
   
           
 
Since     and     are both nonnegative, it must be that     . Thus, when productivity 
growth is exogenous and constant over time, the optimal long-run tax rate on capital 
income is zero. 
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 2.6.2 Indivisible Labour Supply 
Let the Chamley-Judd model allow for indivisible labour supply. When labour supply is 
indivisible, the household faces a choice between working a fixed number of hours and 
not working at all. Rather than deciding whether to work or not, the individual would find 
it optimal to randomize his decision, i.e. engaging in an employment lottery. This makes 
the household receive different labour incomes ex-post and thus gives rise to extrinsic 
labour-income uncertainty. The second-best capital income tax may then be zero in the 
steady state even when markets are complete. In particular, the optimal capital income 
tax is zero if leisure is not neutral. In fact, if leisure is normal (inferior), the income effect 
of a positive (negative) labour income tax makes the individual choose a higher 
probability of work, which enhances the tax base; in a second-best world, the fiscal 
authority can take advantage of this income effect by imposing a positive (negative) wage 
income tax. 
 
 2.6.3 Human Capital  
Suppose that at each date the household is faced also with the decision of how to allocate 
his time between current production and skill acquisition, where skill acquisition 
increases productivity in future periods: 
 
              
   
  
         
 
where:   = current human capital stock 
              = fraction of time currently allocated to production 
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      = fraction of time currently devoted to improving skills 
The introduction of human capital and endogenous growth into the Chamley-Judd 
framework reinforces the conclusion that in the steady state it is optimal not to tax capital 
income. This is due to the fact that changes in labour income taxation affect equally both 
the cost and the benefit side of the marginal condition governing the learning decision: 
the household may invest in learning and thereby increase his labour productivity. 
 
 2.6.4 Small Open Economy 
Consider a country too small to have an influence on world equilibrium prices and 
assume that capital is the mobile factor and labour is the fixed one. The imposition of a 
source-based
1
 tax   on capital in such a country will then not affect the world equilibrium 
rate of return on capital,   . And as capital is assumed to be perfectly mobile across 
borders, investors in the country with the tax will have to realize the same net return they 
may obtain abroad. Hence, their gross return must equal      and the domestic 
market-clearing wage has to fall. This is interpreted to mean that the tax is borne by 
labour and that capital owners remain spared. While taxing labour would also reduce the 
net wage, it would not distort the decision to invest at home versus abroad. Hence, a 
labour income tax is thought to dominate a capital income tax, even from the perspective 
of labour. 
 
 2.6.5 OLG Model 
Consider an economy with turnover in the population: new individuals are continually 
born and old individuals are continually dying. In an overlapping-generations economy 
the second-best (full commitment) optimal capital income tax is zero if the social welfare  
                                                 
1
 The residence-based principle requires a considerable degree of coordination among countries. 
Since, in practice, such a coordination is lacking, governments cannot enforce taxation of 
foreign-source income. 
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function is recursively separable across generations. The intuition for the zero capital 
income tax result comes from the fact that at a steady state the government has to be 
indifferent along two margins of variation. First, the government has to be indifferent in 
transferring physical resources from generation date to the other; second, the government 
has to be indifferent in transferring tax burden from one generation to the other. The rate 
of transformation of capital from one period to the other is the pre-tax interest rate, while 
the rate of transformation of tax burden from one period to the other is the after-tax 
interest rate. The government can only be indifferent in both dimensions if capital is 
untaxed, for then the two stock's rate of transformation are the same.  
 
 2.6.6 Heterogeneous Preferences 
Consider an economy with two infinitely-lived individuals who differ in preferences. The 
preferences of the individuals are of the Uzawa (1968) type, where the rate of time 
preferences are allowed to depend on past consumption and past labour supply. The 
government has access to a capital income tax, a labour income tax and an individual 
specific transfer (not depending on economic activity). The government chooses the taxes 
for the entire future and the tax receipts are used for the individual specific transfers and 
for government expenditure. The government budget is period-by-period balanced. 
Because of the lump-sum transfer the economy is public-debt neutral. The government is 
assumed to maximize a weighted average of the two individuals' utilities. If the economy 
converges to a steady state where the shadow value of government expenditure is 
positive, then the optimal capital income tax is zero. Note, in fact, that under the 
assumption of a perfect capital market, convergence to a steady state implies that the rate 
of time preference for the two classes must be equated. Thus, no Paretian social welfare 
function desires redistributive capital taxation in the long-run, independent of long-run 
factor supply responses, as long as the optimal program converges to a steady state of 
consumption, leisure and assets. 
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2.7 Main Limitation 
The neoclassical model assumes that the net interest rate is fixed. Under such an 
assumption, the problem of optimal capital income taxation is solved a priori. But, this is 
pure idealism: who fixes the net interest rate? 
With respect to this point, we can now develop a very simple model where the net 
interest rate is no longer given. Output is Cobb-Douglas: 
 
       
 
and labour is supplied inelastically. Markets are competitive and, since the exponent on 
capital is 0.5, workers and capitalists each get half of pre-tax GDP in equilibrium. There 
is a fixed amount of government   to pay for each period and budgets are always 
balanced:  
 
               
   tax rate on capital income;    tax rate on labour income 
 
Capitalists accept that part of the tax on capital income lowers the net interest rate: 
 
                       
  coefficient of defensibility of the interest rate from taxes 
 
In the steady state, which policy produces the highest after-tax wages for workers? 
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From the expression for net interest rate it follows that: 
 
     
    
  
 
 
The balanced budget constraint, instead, implies that: 
 
               
 
Combining the previous two equations, we can now rewrite the maximization problem 
as: 
 
   
 
    
  
        
 
The solution to the latter problem is given by: 
 
  
   
  
 
 
Thus, for     (which may be justified, for example, by the difficulty of going abroad), 
the tax on capital income is strictly positive. 
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CHAPTER 3 
SCHUMPETERIAN MODEL 
3.1 Household 
Consider an infinite horizon economy in discrete time and suppose that there is a single 
representative household. At each date the household derives utility from its current 
consumption and its current leisure. Specifically, its current flow of utility is given by: 
 
      
  
   
   
     
 
where:    = consumption at date t 
               = labour supply at date t 
              = inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labour supply 
              = scale parameter for the disutility of labour 
The household is farsighted, in the sense that it cares about not just current utility but also 
expected future utilities. However, at the same time, the household is impatient, in the 
sense that it cares more about the flow of utility expected in the near future than about the 
flow of utility expected much later. Specifically, when evaluating any lifetime plan for 
consumption and labour, it uses a weighted sum of instantaneous utilities: 
 
         
 
   
 
  
   
   
                                                  
 
where   is the discount factor. 
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Besides supplying labour, the household owns physical capital as well as all firms. 
Suppose that capital and labour markets are perfectly competitive and clear at each date, 
that the household has perfect foresight of all future prices and that the tax rates are less 
or equal than one. The basic constraint that the household faces at each date is then: 
 
                                   
(2) 
                                             
 
where:    = physical capital at date t 
               = gross profit at date t 
               = R&D expenses at date t 
               = rental rate of capital at date t 
              = wage rate at date t 
                 = tax rate on capital income at date t 
                 = tax rate on labour income at date t 
                 = tax rate on profits net of R&D expenses at date t 
              = constant rate of capital depreciation 
The household chooses the sequence              
  so as to maximize lifetime utility 
subject to its lifetime budget constraint, taking the initial capital stock as given and 
subject to the condition that the present discounted value of asymptotic capital cannot be 
negative. As with any constrained optimization problem, the solution is derived by 
forming the Lagrangian expression: 
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where    is the Lagrangian multiplier at date t. 
The Kuhn-Tucker necessary conditions are: 
 
  
   
 
 
  
                   
  
   
     
 
                             
  
     
                                          
   
   
       
 
Substituting the first condition into the third one, yields the so-called Euler equation: 
 
    
  
                                                                
 
i.e. a higher discount factor delays consumption whereas a lower depreciation rate, a 
lower tax rate on capital income or a higher rental rate of capital increase consumption 
growth. 
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Combining, instead, the first condition with the second one, gives the consumption-
leisure arbitrage equation: 
 
     
 
                                                                      
 
i.e., for any consumption level, a higher wage rate raises labour supply whereas a higher 
tax rate on labour income or a higher scale of factor disutility reduces labour supply. 
 
3.2 Production 
Consider a closed economy, in which a unique final good is produced. The technological 
possibilities set of each firm is represented by: 
 
     
   
                                                                  
 
where:   = capital stock at date t 
              = intermediate goods basket at date t 
              = total output of the final good at date t 
Assume that both   and   are produced under perfect competition and choose the final 
good as the numeraire. By Euler's identity, we have then that: 
 
               
 
where      is  the price of the intermediate goods basket at time t. 
CHAPTER 3- SCHUMPETERIAN MODEL 
 
 
~ 45 ~ 
  
Moreover, suppose that    is produced according to the aggregator: 
 
              
 
 
                                                          
 
where      is the amount of intermediate input i used in the production of   . Such a 
logarithmic structure implies that the producer of    will spend the same amount 
           on each intermediate input i. The demand for each intermediate input i at 
time t is then: 
 
     
  
    
                                                                     
 
where      is the price of intermediate input i at time t. 
Each intermediate input i is produced by a one-period-lived ex-post monopolist. This 
firm holds the patent to the most advanced technology described by: 
 
                                                                                 
 
where      is the amount of labour employed by intermediate input producer i at time t and 
     is the corresponding productivity. Its marginal cost of production is: 
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At the same time, in each sector i, there is a fringe of firms that can potentially produce 
the intermediate input using the previous technology: 
 
                
    
 
         
 
where   is the step of the innovation of the new technology. The potential producers have 
a marginal cost: 
 
   
    
 
 
By Bertrand competition among all firms in sector i, the latest innovator will set its price 
equal to the marginal cost of the previous innovator: 
 
     
   
    
                                                               
 
The equilibrium profit of intermediate input producer i at time t is then: 
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In this expression we can see how the profit is determined by the innovation step of the 
monopolist; in particular, profits go to 0 when    . Also, we see that the equilibrium 
profit is proportional to    . 
Combining now (7), (8) and (9), the amount of labour employed by intermediate input 
producer i is: 
 
     
   
   
                                                                   
 
which, by the market clearing condition           
 
 
, implies on turn: 
 
    
   
 
 
 
                                                                   
 
Note that the labour share in the intermediate goods basket goes to 1 as markups vanish. 
Substituting further (10) into (6), we get the wage rate as: 
 
   
     
 
   
  
  
 
 
                                                    
 
where    is an aggregate productivity index defined by: 
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and the price of    is simply its marginal product in the final good production: 
 
            
   
                                                           
 
Equation (12) shows that equilibrium wages are proportional to aggregate productivity 
and, in a balanced growth path where 
  
  
 is constant, these two variables will grow at the 
same rate. 
Still, combining (11), (12) and (13), we can rewrite the production function (5) in the 
reduced form: 
 
     
       
                                                                
 
Such a reduced form tells us that the technology for the final good is actually Cobb-
Douglas in capital and labour. 
Finally, using the fact that the equilibrium rental rate of capital is simply the marginal 
product of capital in the final good production: 
 
      
     
                                                                
 
yields a capital share of output equal to: 
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Similarly, applying (13), the factor share for the intermediate goods basket is equal to: 
 
   
  
       
 
This factor share is itself decomposed into the labour share: 
 
    
  
 
   
   
 
 
 
                                                      
 
and the profit share: 
 
  
  
 
       
  
 
   
  
 
 
  
 
   
 
                                       
 
From these last expressions we learn that the share of capital, labour and profits are 
determined by two parameters:   and  . Moreover, (i) aggregate (monopoly) profits are 
equal to zero when    ; (ii) aggregate profits are proportional to aggregate final output. 
 
3.3 Innovation and growth 
At the beginning of every period  , there is the opportunity to innovate in order to 
increase labour productivity in any intermediate sector i by some given factor    .  
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More specifically, a potential innovator must spend the amount: 
 
            
 
of final good to innovate at a total rate           , where     is the innovation intensity of 
other potential innovators.  
Assume that, in each intermediate goods sector i, there is always a monopolist producing. 
Moreover, assume that current period R&D only affects the technology tomorrow. Such a 
timing convention implies that a new successful inventor gets the monopoly right to 
produce with the current technology but without the new quality jump that it creates. 
Finally, assume that firms' R&D spending and gross profits are not publicly verifiable. 
This assumption involves that the government cannot commit ex ante to rewarding 
successful innovators either by directly subsidizing R&D costs or by subsidizing gross 
profits from innovation.  
Since expenses on R&D can be taken out from gross profits for tax purposes, the 
resulting maximization problem for innovators is then: 
 
   
  
         
    
   
                                                      
 
In a symmetric equilibrium the innovation rate is given by: 
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Thus, the equilibrium growth rate is: 
 
    
  
   
   
 
   
 
  
  
                                            
 
Note that this growth rate depends negatively on the share of capital   and the cost of 
R&D  ; but positively on markups   and normalized market size      . 
Still, the total amount of the final good used in R&D is: 
 
          
   
 
                                           
 
where     
   
 
     . Note that (17) and (20) imply that profits net of R&D are 
simply zero. 
 
3.4 Government 
Government spending is assumed to grow at the same rate as the economy: 
 
                                                                       
 
where    is exogenously given. 
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The government will choose the tax policy                    
 
 so as to maximize 
intertemporal welfare subject to the above dynamic equilibrium conditions, together with 
the balanced budget constraint: 
 
                                                                   
 
and the aggregate resource constraint of the economy: 
 
                                                              
 
3.5 Equilibrium and balanced growth 
Definition of equilibrium: Given tax policy                    
 
 and initial conditions     
and   , a dynamic equilibrium for the model is a tuple                                
  
such that given prices, the household maximize (conditions (3) and (4)), all firms 
maximize (conditions (15), (16), (17), and (19)), the government satisfies its budget 
constraint (22), and markets clear (conditions (5), (20) and (23)). 
 
After suitable substitutions, the conditions in the above definition boil down to the 
following system of equations: 
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Definition of balanced growth path: A balanced growth path is a dynamic equilibrium 
where the aggregate variables                          
  grow at the same constant rate 
g and           
  remain constant. 
 
3.6 Analytical solutions 
Proposition 1: Consider the benchmark economy with full capital depreciation    . 
Then, the balanced growth equilibrium takes the following form: 
 
                   
  
 
where: 
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and: 
 
    
             
       
 
 
   
                                                  
 
Proof: Setting     and denoting with "lower-case tilde" the variables per effective 
worker, the balanced growth equilibrium system becomes: 
 
     
        
    
     
  
  
                                                     
     
    
  
                  
  
    
   
     
                                    
      
   
         
   
 
                                                 
       
                                                                   
  
  
  
   
 
                                                             
    
  
   
      
 
   
 
                                                
 
If we conjecture next that           , from (34) it follows immediately: 
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while (32), (33) and (36) lead to: 
 
  
          
 
    
   
 
                 
 
This proposition implies that equilibrium labour supply is decreasing in the tax rate on 
labour income. 
 
Proposition 2: For   close to 1, the steady state growth rate of the benchmark economy 
is approximately equal to: 
 
           
   
 
          
 
    
              
                        
           
                        
 
 
   
 
 
Proof: In the steady state the growth rate is: 
 
     
      
 
   
 
      
 
Taking the second order Taylor approximation of this expression around    , yields: 
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Thus, by the steady state version of (30), (31), (33) and (35), we can conclude: 
 
           
   
 
          
 
    
              
                         
           
                        
 
 
   
 
 
The higher the tax rate on labour income, the lower the amount of labour supply in 
equilibrium and therefore the lower the size of monopoly profits to successful innovators. 
This, in turn, lowers R&D incentives and thus the equilibrium innovation efforts. 
Similarly, taxing capital income also reduces innovation incentives by lowering the 
capital stock of the economy. 
 
Lemma: When the tax rate on labour income is initially high, then an increase in the 
labour income tax rate is more detrimental to growth than an increase in the capital 
income tax rate 
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Proof: Rewrite the steady state growth rate of the economy as: 
 
 
       
     
 
        
                 
 
 
 
 
where: 
 
        
   
 
 
  
 
   
   
 
   
                   
 
Deriving the term in curly brackets with respect to  , yields: 
 
    
  
 
     
 
              
                  
 
 
For    : 
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Deriving, instead, the term in curly brackets with respect to  , yields: 
 
    
  
 
     
 
          
 
 
  
 
 
              
 
   
  
                  
 
 
For    : 
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CHAPTER 4 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
4.1 Model Implications 
Let us now select values for the parameters             to match certain observations of 
the US economy: 
 
        
        
        
         
      
        
 
Four further results can then be derived from the Schumpeterian model presented in the 
previous chapter: 
 
1) net wages cannot be reduced to zero 
As long as government expenditure is low, the optimal fiscal policy consists of a subsidy to 
capital financed by a positive tax on labour income, which also finances the government 
expenditure. 
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Figure 1:Growth Rate as a Function of Tax on Capital and Labour Income for G/Y=0.2 
 
   
             
        
 
There are two reasons for this. First, we have monopolistic competition in the intermediate 
input sector. Therefore, the production level is too low with respect to first-best. By 
subsidizing capital we induce a higher level of production. Second, by subsidizing capital 
we increase the market size since more capital is accumulated and output grows.  
However, when government expenditure rises, the tax rate on labour income must grow, 
increasing the distortions in labour supply, lowering hours worked and, with them, the 
markets size. The only way to minimize this impact is by reducing the subsidy to capital, to 
the point it eventually becomes positive. 
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Figure 2: Growth Rate as a Function of Tax on Capital and Labour Income for G/Y=0.7 
 
   
             
            
 
Figure 3: Tax on Capital and Labour Income as a Function of Share of Public Spending in 
GDP 
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2) an expansion of the weight of the public sector in the economy is detrimental for 
growth 
Since government expenditure doesn't enter neither the production function nor the utility 
function and there is no debt financing, a higher share of public spending in total GDP only 
means that the household has to pay more taxes on its overall income. This negatively 
affects both labour supply and capital accumulation. Hence, the market size falls and, with 
it, also the innovation rate. 
 
Figure 4: Growth Rate as a Function of Public Spending Share 
 
 
3) it is in the interest of both workers and capitalists to reduce tax evasion 
In the presence of tax evasion, the tax rate on labour income must grow so as to compensate 
for the loss in tax base. As higher labour income taxation entails also increasing distortions 
in the market size, the tax rate on capital income must grow as well. Thus, not only workers, 
but also capitalists suffer an undue subtraction of earnings and would be better off by 
reporting their true income to the tax authorities. 
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Figure 5: Growth Rate as a Function of Tax on Capital and Labour Income for G/Y=0.5 
 
   
            
             
 
Figure 6: Growth Rate as a Function of Tax on Capital and Labour Income for G/Y=0.5 
and with (capital-income tax evasion)=0.13 and (labour-income tax evasion)=0.07 
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4) the tax rate on labour income cannot exceed one 
If the tax rate on labour income is allowed to take on also values strictly greater than one, 
the function of the economy's steady state growth rate, comes to exhibit a discontinuity. 
Hence, there is no solution to the government’s maximization problem. 
 
Figure 7: Growth Rate as a Function of Tax on Capital and Labour Income for G/Y=0.5 
and      
 
 
 
3.2 Comparative Statics 
So far we have examined the implications of the Schumpeterian model for fixed values of 
its parameters. Let us next set the share of public spending in total GDP,    , equal to 0.5. 
What are the effects of changes in the parameters  ,  ,   and   on the labour income tax, 
the capital income tax and the economy's growth rate? 
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 (i) an increase in   induces an increase in both     and    
Since balanced budget is assumed, a higher capital income share is equivalent to a lower 
labour income share. To finance government expenditure, the tax rate on labour income 
must then grow, but this leads also to increasing distortions in the labour supply. The 
resulting reduction in market size can be mitigated only by raising also the tax rate on 
capital income. 
 (ii) an increase in   is bad for growth 
Since the market size is negatively affected by a higher capital income share, intermediate 
input producers have fewer incentives to innovate and so there will be less innovation 
efforts. 
 
Figure 8: Effect on Income Taxes and Growth of an Increase in   
                       α=0.295                                             α=0.5  
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 (i) an increase in   implies an increase in both    and    
As intermediate input producers gain greater market power, we have two effects: on the one 
hand, the production level falls farther behind with respect to first-best; on the other hand, 
the labour income share declines. Both these effects call for an expansion in labour income 
taxation, whose increasingly distorsive impact on market size is alleviated by a rise also in 
the capital income tax.  
 (ii) an increase in   stimulates growth 
The less competition there is in the intermediate input sector, the greater the size of 
monopoly rents that will be appropriated by successful innovators and, therefore, the larger 
the incentives to innovate. 
 
Figure 9: Effect on Income Taxes and Growth of an Increase in   
               λ=1.0522                                     λ=1.1 
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 (i) an increase in   involves an increase in    and a decrease  in    
When labour supply is not very elastic, the optimal policy is to tax labour income heavily 
since this will have only a small impact on hours worked. The proceeds of the labour 
income tax are then used to subsidize capital, whose accumulation instead continues to be 
strongly affected by capital income taxation. Thus, contrary to conventional wisdom, market 
size considerations tilt fiscal policy against labor income and in favor of capital income. 
 (ii) an increase in   enhances growth 
Given that more capital is accumulated in the presence of a smaller labour supply elasticity, 
the market size increases and so does also the innovation rate. 
 
Figure 10: Effect on Income Taxes and Growth of a rise in   
                                η=0.833                                                             η=2 
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 (i) a decrease in   entails a decrease in    and an increase in     
When agents are more impatient, they are willing to accept larger contractions in the capital 
stock for the purpose of rising resources available to consumption. Thus, a fall in the 
intertemporal discount factor  is met by a rise in the capital income tax rate and a decline in 
the labour income tax rate. 
 (ii) a decrease in   deters growth 
By curbing savings in favour of consumption, impatience involves a reduction in capital 
accumulation, lowering so total output and, with it, innovation efforts. 
 
Figure 11: Effect on Income Taxes and Growth of a Fall in   
                             β=0.979                                                               β=0.8 
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CHAPTER 5 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
Theory and practice are generally difficult to conjugate. It is likely that specific incentive 
constraints in the decision problem of optimizing policymakers cause deviations in observed 
economic policies from a hypothetical social optimum (Persson and Tabellini, 1997): 
 
- lack of credibility: when policy decisions are taken sequentially over time, desirable 
policies may not be viewed as credible by the citizens and so the government is forced to 
react to self-fulfilling private expectations; 
 
- political opportunism: the incumbent government is prepared to introduce distorted 
policies in order to increase its chances of re-election; 
 
- political ideology: political polarization (i.e. different parties pursue different "partisan" 
platforms once in office) and political instability (i.e. the election outcome is uncertain) 
influence policy formation;  
 
- divided government: policies are often the outcome of a decision-making power that is 
dispersed among several political actors;  
 
- corruption: the incumbent government is induced to channel a huge amount of resources 
with the purpose of favouring certain  influential groups within society; and 
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- pressure for redistribution: if there is income inequality across the population, tax policies 
are likely to be shaped by a redistributive motive.  
 
For our purposes, of special importance is the political constraint "pressure for 
redistribution". There are two major measures of income distribution. One measure is the 
functional income distribution, which examines the distribution of income between the main 
factors of production (labour and capital). It shows the respective shares in national income 
of wages and salaries on the one hand, and profits, interests and rents on the other. The 
second measure is that of personal income distribution, which refers to the distribution of 
income among households or individuals, irrespective of its source. A given household or 
individual may receive income from both labour activity and capital revenues, as well as 
from pensions and other public-sector transfers. 
The different degrees of inequality in the distribution of primary revenues contribute to 
determine inequality in household incomes. In fact, since capital is generally concentrated in 
relatively few hands, a rising share of returns on capital in total income tends to increase 
personal inequality. Using two high-quality and homogeneous datasets starting from 1970, 
Giovannoni (2010) documented that a decreasing labor share and increasing inequality are 
simultaneously observed in 17 out of 25 countries. Similarly, Daudey and Garcia-Penalosa 
(2007) examine 39 countries and prove on the basis of cross-country and panel data that a 
larger labour share is associated with a lower Gini index of personal incomes (for example, 
an increase in the labour share in Mexico to that in the United States would reduce the Gini 
index of the former by between two and five points).  
 
 
5.1  PUBLIC SPENDING SHARE 
Nevertheless, in specific circumstances empirical evidence seems to confirm the idea that 
capital income taxation depends on the share of public spending in total GDP, although the 
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latter appears in turn to move in the same direction as the share of labour income in total 
GDP (contrary to the predictions of the Schumpeterian model). 
 
Figure 12: Labour Income Share as a Function of Public Spending Share 
 
Sources:  Economy Watch Statistics, OECD Tax Database, World  Bank Database, 
AMECO Online, World Tax Database 
 
 
Specifically, the lower is the public spending share in total GDP (and, hence, the lower is 
the labour income share in total GDP), the smaller tends to be the tax rate on capital income. 
To illustrate this point, we are now going to examine more in detail the variables "% growth 
rate of GDP", "% share of public spending in total GDP", "% share of labour income in total 
GDP per person employed", "% top marginal tax rate on dividend income" (both at the 
corporate and personal level) and "%top marginal tax rate on labour income", with respect 
to tax haven countries, Ireland during the Celtic Tiger period and Sweden since the early 
1990s. 
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 5.1.1 Tax Havens 
 
Table 3 (Switzerland): G/Y = share of public spending in GDP; g = growth rate of GDP; 
PIT L = combined (central and sub-central) top marginal tax rate on wage income; CIT = 
combined top marginal tax rate on dividend income at corporate level; PIT D = combined 
top marginal tax rate on dividend income at personal level; adj. wL/Y = share of labour 
compensation in GDP at market prices per person employed, (in percentage terms) 
 
 
 
Sources:  Economy Watch Statistics, OECD Tax Database, World   Bank Database,    
      AMECO Online, World Tax Database 
Time g G/Y PIT L CIT PIT D 
adj. 
wL/Y 
1980-84 0.97 32 NA 33,05 44,3 NA 
1985-89 2.96 31.08 11.5 31.3 41.86 NA 
1990-94 0.8 34.16 11.5 28.6 41.62 69.31 
1995-99 1.58 36.38 12.25 27.68 42.4 69.22 
2000-04 1.64 35.95 41.8 24.44 41.08 69.24 
2005-09 2.26 33.71 41.94 21.82 33.38 66.9 
2010-13 1.95 32.86 41.7 21.17 20 68 
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Figure 13: Personal Dividend Income Tax as a Function of Public Spending Share 
 
Sources: Economy Watch Statistics, OECD Tax Database, World Bank Database, AMECO 
Online, World Tax Database 
 
 
Given limited government expenditures, tax havens are jurisdictions with no or low taxes. 
There are several examples around the world today, including among others: Andorra, 
Switzerland,  Luxembourg and Monaco in Europe, Hong-Kong and Singapore in Asia, the 
Cayman Islands, the Netherlands Antilles and Panama in America. Tax haven countries 
have enjoyed very rapid economic growth rates. They averaged 3.3% annual per capita real 
GDP growth from 1982 to 1999, whereas the world averaged just 1.4% annual real per 
capita GDP growth over the same period. Controlling for country size, initial wealth and 
other observable variables does not change the conclusion that the period of globalization 
has been favourable for the economies of tax havens (Hines, 2005). 
Note, however, that, while the public spending share in total GDP is actually quite low in all 
tax haven countries, the same is not true for the labour income share in total GDP: in fact, 
(as emerges from Table 3) Switzerland, for example, is characterized by a rather high and 
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constant labour income share over the period 1990-2013. Still, besides lower tax rates, other 
factors as well account for the economic growth of tax havens: 
 
- Tax havens score well on cross-country measures of governance quality, that include 
measures of voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, 
rule of law and control of corruption. Poorly governed countries, of which the world 
has many, almost never become tax havens (Dharmapala and Hines, 2006). 
 
- Tax havens are often used by individuals and firms to avoid taxes that would 
otherwise be owed to governments of other countries. This opportunity, made 
possible by lack of effective exchange of information and by lack of transparency, 
may divert economic activity from countries with higher tax rates and erode their tax 
base. 
 
- Most tax havens are tiny nations with few natural or industrial resources. Their whole 
existence would be threatened were it not for the booming financial industry growing 
in the shadow of foreign capital. 
 
- Typically, in tax havens two different tax systems exist together. While citizens and 
corporations residing in the country are required to pay taxes like elsewhere in the 
world, foreign investors enjoy total exemption or at least a substantial reduction of 
taxes to be paid.  
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 5.1.2 Ireland 
 
Table 4 (Ireland): G/Y = share of public spending in GDP; g = growth rate of GDP; PIT L 
= combined (central and sub-central) top marginal tax rate on wage income; CIT = 
combined top marginal tax rate on dividend income at corporate level; PIT D = combined 
top marginal tax rate on dividend income at personal level; adj. wL/Y = share of labour 
compensation in GDP at market prices per person employed, (in percentage terms) 
 
 
 Sources:  Economy Watch Statistics, OECD Tax Database, World Bank Database,    
      AMECO Online, World Tax Database 
 Time g G/Y PIT L CIT PIT D 
adj. 
wL/Y 
1980-84 2.58 50.61 61.25 47.8 61.76 65.12 
1985-89 3.68 49.02 59.8 48.0 58.46 60.3 
1990-94 4.44 43.37 51.4 40.6 50.22 58.54 
1995-99 10.1 36.1 47.2 34.0 47.3 52.04 
2000-04 5.78 32.43 42.4 17.0 42.4 46.15 
2005-09 1.6 38.8 42.6 12.5 41.4 50.15 
2010-13 0.25 48.95 47.75 12.5 46.25 49.7 
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When “Economic Development” was published in 1958, there was good reason to worry 
about Ireland’s economic performance and its economic prospects. While most western 
European countries were enjoying rapid economic growth, Ireland was falling well behind 
the leaders. With an industrial-relations structure based on strong but de-centralized 
collective bargaining and as a small, inefficient and still quite agricultural economy on the 
periphery, Ireland was not in a position to follow the corporatist path to rapid catch-up 
growth and to bear the consequences of moves to free trade within Europe. 
Fast forward to 2007 and Ireland had overtaken all European economies (except for 
Luxembourg) in terms of real GDP per person. In fact, between 1987 and 2007, the so-
called Celtic Tiger period, real GDP per person grew at 5.6% per year. The key policy 
instrument underpinning this transition to fast growth was a low corporate tax rate which 
attracted a disproportionate amount of foreign direct investment, mainly from the US. Such 
a low rate may be interpreted as the outcome of a falling public spending share.  
 
Figure 14: Corporate Dividend Income Tax as a Function of Public Spending Share 
 
Sources:  Economy Watch Statistics, OECD Tax Database, World Bank Database, AMECO 
Online, World Tax Database 
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Note, however, that the personal tax on dividend income remained instead quite high in 
Ireland during the Celtic Tiger period (see Table 4). Still, there was more than cuts in the 
corporate tax rate to preparing for the exceptional Irish growth: 
 
- Ireland developed a sophisticated policy framework to select projects for financial 
support and made complementary investments in education and infrastructure 
(Buckley and Ruane, 2006). 
 
- The Social Partnership inaugurated in 1987 delivered wage restraint in return for tax 
cuts and the advent of centralized wage bargaining promoted investment (Baccaro 
and Simoni, 2007). Together with the responsiveness of migration flows to faster 
growth, these developments ensured that Ireland had an elastic labour supply and 
paved the way for rapid employment growth. 
 
- Foreign direct investments increasingly clustered in the ICT-production industry, the 
sector which experienced phenomenal technological progress and productivity 
growth at this time (Crafts, 2008). 
 
- The dynamic came from total factor productivity growth rather than from massive 
investment in physical and human capital (Bosworth and Collins, 2003): the Irish 
investment rate over these years averaged just under 20% of GDP. 
- It is generally agreed that recent Irish growth is better measured on a GNP basis, 
because this leaves out the huge flow of repatriated profits of multinational 
companies which are inflated by transfer pricing encouraged by the generous 
corporate tax regime (Cassidy, 2004). 
 
- The low corporate tax rate was an option that would not have been available under 
British rule (Crafts, 2008). 
  
CHAPTER 5- EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
 
 
~ 78 ~ 
 
 5.1.3 Sweden 
 
Table 5 (Sweden): G/Y = share of public spending in GDP; g = growth rate of GDP; PIT L 
= combined (central and sub-central) top marginal tax rate on wage income; CIT = 
combined top marginal tax rate on dividend income at corporate level; PIT D = combined 
top marginal tax rate on dividend income at personal level; adj. wL/Y = share of labour 
compensation in GDP at market prices per person employed, (in percentage terms) 
 
 
 
Sources: Economy Watch Statistics, OECD Tax Database, World Bank Database, AMECO 
    Online, World Tax Database 
Time g G/Y PIT L CIT PIT D 
adj. 
wL/Y 
1980-84 1.9 62.96 84.0 57.54 79.2 53.21 
1985-89 2.72 59.51 76.8 57.3 69.16 50.34 
1990-94 0.08 64.06 33 34.2 37.24 50.56 
1995-99 3.42 58.37 30.4 28.0 30.0 47.66 
2000-04 2.96 52.82 55.82 28.0 30.0 48.51 
2005-09 1.04 50.78 56.54 27.66 30.0 48.12 
2010-13 3.0 50.21 56.6 25.22 30.0 49.5 
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Figure 15: Personal Dividend Income Tax as a Function of Public Spending Share 
 
Sources:  Economy Watch Statistics, OECD Tax Database, World Bank Database, AMECO 
Online, World Tax Database 
 
 
Historically, Sweden has been characterized by a large public sector and rather ambitious 
distributional policy goals. In the early 1990s, it gradually came to acknowledge that taxing 
(some forms of) capital income at the high marginal tax rates applied to (high levels of) 
labour income created intolerable distortions and horizontal inequities. In order to improve 
efficiency in the redistribution of income, Sweden introduced the so called dual income tax. 
The DIT is a particular form of schedular income tax regime which combines progressive 
taxation of labour and transfer income with a flat tax on all capital income. 
Although at the theoretical level it can be argued that the DIT is desirable because it serves 
to equalize the tax treatment of physical and human capital investment, Swedish policy 
makers have actually been more persuaded by a number of practical and pragmatic 
considerations (Sørensen, 2010): 
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- inflation: Income tax is levied on the full nominal return to capital, including the 
inflation premium that compensates for the erosion of the real value of nominal 
assets. Thus many forms of capital income are overtaxed if charged at the top 
marginal tax rate applying to labour income. 
 
- capital mobility: As the international mobility of capital increases, there is a growing 
risk that a high domestic capital income tax rate will induce taxpayers to move their 
wealth abroad, making it very difficult to bring that income into the domestic tax net. 
Setting a lower domestic capital income tax rate reduces the risk of capital flight. 
 
- tax neutrality: Capital income accrues in many forms, some of which are hard to tax. 
Lowering the tax rate on those types of capital income that can be taxed reduces the 
distortions arising when certain types of capital income cannot be included in the tax 
base. A low tax rate also makes it easier to broaden the tax base, for instance by 
including capital gains without causing severe lock-in effects. 
 
 
5.2 TAX EVASION  
Moreover, empirical evidence seems also to confirm the idea that capital income taxation 
depends on the level of tax evasion. Specifically, the larger the amount of income not 
reported to the tax authorities, the higher tends to be the tax rate on capital income. In this 
respect, it might be interesting to consider the case of Italy. 
In Italy the fiscal burden is higher than the European average and the interventions 
conceived by the Italian politicians to get out of the crisis involved a further increase in 
taxation. Indeed, Italy is the European country with the highest implicit tax rate on capital 
and corporate income. 
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Figure 16: Implicit Tax Rate on Capital Income in Europe 
 
Source: European Commission, Taxation trends in the EU, 2012 
 
 
and is largely above the European average as far as the effective taxation of labour income 
is concerned: 
 
Figure 17: Implicit Tax Rate on Labour Income 
 
Source: European Commission, Taxation trends in the EU, 2012 
 
If Italy were able to reduce both government expenditure and fiscal burden and managed to 
simplify the fiscal system, two main objectives could be reached: secure public finances and 
recover competiveness. All this could be addressed also by means of a fight without borders 
against tax evasion. Italy accounts for 40% of all taxes evaded in Europe; more precisely, 
tax evasion in Italy amounts to 180 billion euro each year (Murphy, 2012). 
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Table 6: Tax Evasion in Europe (on 2009 data) 
Country Tax Lost as a 
Proportion of 
Tax Income 
(%) 
Tax Lost as a 
Result of Shadow 
Economy  
(billion euro) 
Italy 27 180.257 
Germany 16 158.736 
France 15 120.619 
United Kingdom 12.5 74.032 
Spain 22.5 72.709 
Belgium 21.9 33.629 
Netherlands 13.2 29.801 
Total  864.282 
Source: Tax Research LLP 
 
Such high levels of tax evasion subtract a huge amount of inland revenue to the government 
and increase the levy on the honest taxpayers. Still, generating unfair competition among 
firms, they distort the economic choices of the agents and hence give rise to inefficiencies in 
the productive system. 
The problem is that in Italy there is a widespread tolerance towards tax evasion. Of 40 
million taxpayers, 11 million avoid taxes (Corte dei Conti, 2013). Of course, all these 
evaders have the right to vote, forming a quarter of the electorate. In such a framework, no 
ruling class is willing to defeat tax evasion. A first step in the direction of fighting tax 
evasion could be the uniformity of judgment among the various European countries, i.e. a 
financial Europe where citizens no longer can move from one country to another in order to 
evade taxes. 
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5.3  ECONOMIC GROWTH 
As already emerges from the previous empirical analysis, the record offers, instead, little 
support for a strong view about a precise relation between the labour/capital income tax rate 
and the economic growth rate.  
 
Figure 18: Growth Rate as a Function of Corporate Dividend Income Tax 
 
 
Figure 18a: Growth Rate as a Function of Personal Dividend Income Tax 
 
Sources:  Economy Watch Statistics, OECD Tax Database, World Bank Database, AMECO 
Online, World Tax Databas 
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Figure 19: Growth Rate as a Function of Labour Income Tax 
 
Sources:  Economy Watch Statistics, OECD Tax Database, World Bank Database, AMECO 
Online, World Tax Database 
 
 
Consider, for example, the tax cut signed into law by Ronald Regan in 1981. Such a tax cut 
was indeed followed by an economic boom. But, Krugman (2001) argues that, "much of the 
credit for that boom- a rapid recovery from the devastating recession of 1979-82- goes to 
the Fed, which abruptly switched from a tight money-policy to an easy-money policy in the 
summer of 1982. Moreover, the boom was not a supply-side event but a demand-side 
recovery, a surge in consumer and business spending that allowed the economy to put 
workers back to work and get factories running again". The latter argument of Krugman has 
been criticized by Niskanen and Moore (1996), who posit that the Keynesian explanation of 
the economic recovery in the 1980s is fundamentally inconsistent with the fall in the rate of 
nominal demand growth and with the decline in inflation over the decade. Notwithstanding, 
the growth rate from the peak in 1979 to that in 1990 was basically the same as the growth 
rate  between the previous two peaks: 
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Table 7: US Economic Growth Rate, Selected Periods (in percent) 
from peak to peak Growth Rate 
1973-1979 3.0 
1979-1990 2.9 
1990-2000 3.2 
Source: Economic Report of the President 
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CHAPTER 6 
LIMITATIONS OF 
SCHUMPETERIAN MODEL 
6.1 Main Limitations of the Analysis 
The Schumpeterian model offers a better explanation of actual tax dynamics than the 
neoclassical model. However, it still suffers of some important limitations: 
 
- The model supposes that there is a single representative household in the economy. 
This assumption implies that there can be no equity considerations in the setting of 
tax rates so that the resulting tax rule describes an efficient tax system. However, in 
considering the practical value of a fiscal policy, its distributional impact must also 
be borne in mind. In fact, inequality lies at the heart of every major political and 
economic crisis. With an uneven (personal and functional) income distribution, the 
poor agents in the economy are willing to accept higher tax rates on capital income 
for the purpose of transferring resources to consumption. 
 
- The model limits its attention to a closed economy. Yet, in today's globalized world 
most economies, especially the small ones, cannot be viewed in isolation. Their 
economic performance, or even their whole existence, would be threatened were it 
not for the international exchanges of goods and for the cross-country flows of 
production factors. In a multi-country model, perfect capital mobility implies that the 
domestic net interest rate is fixed at the world net rate of return. Hence, taxes on 
capital income, by generating a wedge between the treatment of domestic and foreign 
assets, induce an additional distortion, namely capital flight.  
Moreover, in a multi-country model, each time a firm in one sector of one country 
innovates by inventing a new intermediate product, the productivity of that 
intermediate product is determined by a world-wide technology frontier that grows as 
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a result of innovations throughout the world (Howitt, 2000). As long as a country 
maintains enough incentives that some domestic innovation takes place, it will join 
the convergence club, and its growth rate will ultimately converge to that of all the 
other members. The mechanism through which convergence occurs is technology 
transfer. That is, the growth rate of productivity equals the product of the frequency 
and size of innovations. 
Finally, in a multi-country model, there are three broad channels which transmit the 
effects of economic openness to long-run growth (Dinopoulos, 2006). First, trade, by 
increasing the size of the market, raises the profitability of R&D investment and 
increases the long-run rate of innovation and growth in all trading countries. Second, 
economic openness, by facilitating the exchange of information, increases the scope 
of knowledge spillovers, raises the productivity of researchers and accelerates the 
rates of innovation and growth in the global economy. Third, trade openness, by 
reallocating economic resources across sectors and between R&D investment and 
manufacturing activities, affects (ambiguously) the long-run rates of innovation and 
growth. 
 
- The model considers only a single form of labour service. In reality, there are many 
forms of labour in an economy which differ in the skills they require and in the 
working conditions they impose. The actual monetary payment for the supply of 
labour may only be part of the package of remuneration and some of the return (or 
cost) may be entirely psychic in nature. An income tax policy designed to maximize 
welfare would need to take account of the entire package of characteristics that 
constitutes labour supply: in fact, different types of labour are likely to be subject to 
different elasticities of labour supply. Moreover, the labour supply decision also 
involves more than simply the determination of the number of hours of work. As 
occupations differ in their characteristics, the choice between occupations becomes 
important and this choice will be affected by income taxation. For instance, an 
increase in taxation will be detrimental to occupations where the return is 
predominantly monetary. Finally, there are still intertemporal aspects to the labour  
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supply decision such as the timing of entry to the labour force and the timing of 
retirement. As an income tax will introduce a distortion into such decisions, this 
increases the potential efficiency loss (Christansen, 1988). 
 
- The model deals with proportional taxes, which imply a constant marginal tax rate. 
The advantage of this restriction is that it ensures that the budget set of the household 
is convex so that optimal choices will be unique when preferences are strictly 
convex. In the modern fiscal state, total tax payments are often close to proportional 
to individual income, especially in countries where the total is large. It would be 
wrong, however, to conclude that progressive taxation plays only a limited role in 
modern fiscal systems. Indeed, even if taxation overall is fairly close to proportional 
for the majority of the population, the fact that the highest incomes and largest 
fortunes are taxed at significantly higher (or lower) rates has a strong influence on 
the structure of inequality. 
 
- The model predicts that competition should reduce growth through a well-known 
appropriability effect, that is by reducing the prospective monopoly rents that spur 
innovation. The available evidence seems however to contradict this prediction. As a 
result, a variety of channels through which competition might in fact stimulate 
economic growth has been identified. These include, among others: barriers to entry 
(to the extent that these barriers raise the cost to outside firms of introducing new 
technologies, they reduce the incentive to perform R&D, thus reducing the long-run 
growth rate); agency costs (to the extent that an increase in competition reduces the 
firm's flow of profits it reduces the scope for managerial slack and forces managers 
to innovate more often, Aghion et al. (1999)); decreasing returns to R&D (although 
an increase in the intensity of competition will tend to reduce the absolute level of 
profits realized by a successful innovator, it will tend to reduce the profits of an 
unsuccessful innovator by even more and, hence, firms will try to innovate in order 
to escape competition, Aghion et al. (2001)).  
CHAPTER 6- LIMITATIONS OF  SCHUMPETERIAN MODEL 
 
 
~ 90 ~ 
 
- The model derives the steady state growth rate of the economy under the assumption 
of full capital depreciation  (   ). However, in practice, the rate of capital 
depreciation is actually far below one: in developed countries it amounts to 0.1, while 
in developing countries it is about 0.03. A lower depreciation rate means that capital 
is valued more and, hence, taxed less. 
 
 
6.2 Other Limitations of the Model 
Besides the previous critics relevant for the present analysis, the Schumpeterian model also 
has a number of other drawbacks: 
 
- The model makes assumptions that ensure the existence of a steady state with 
balanced growth. These assumptions are quite severe and have nothing to 
recommend them except for tractability. They rule out important phenomena and 
answer important questions by mere assertation. For example, they miss the stages of 
development in which resources are gradually reallocated from agriculture to 
manufacturing and then to services, all with different factor requirements and with 
different technological dynamics. The economy is a scaled-up version of what it was 
years ago and no matter how far it has developed already the prospects for future 
development are always a scaled-up version of what they were years ago. 
 
- The model uses a constant returns to scale production function for the final good. 
Many empirical works, instead, have shown how in the economic activity, especially 
the industrial one, increasing returns to scale are the norm. With increasing returns to 
scale there is no longer perfect competition in the final good sector, but monopolistic 
competition. In fact, by increasing production, each firm of the final good sector will 
exhibit decreasing costs and this will induce the firm to lower the price continuously, 
expanding so its market share. 
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- The model describes knowledge as a parameter Q which fits into the aggregate 
production function much like any other factor of production. Assuming that labour 
and capital can be aggregated strains credibility, but it is hard to know even what is 
meant by assuming that ideas can be aggregated. A more natural way to think about 
the growth of knowledge would be to use either the adaptive models of learning 
found in the macroeconomic literature on convergence to rational-expectations 
equilibrium or Bayesian models of learning by experimentation. 
 
- The model relies on perfect capital markets. The recent crisis has proved how the 
financial sector may be the origin of deep imbalances and has shed light on the fact 
that the economy of this century depends heavily on the working of the banking 
system. Indeed, although the crisis of 2008/9 has been brought about precisely by the 
behaviours of the banks, the latter have received widespread protection from the 
governments even when the other sectors have been cut. 
 
- The model assumes that the government revenue requirement is pre-determined. The 
satisfaction of the revenue constraint implicitly prevents the government from issuing 
debt. While the conservative perspective is that public debt can only be harmful to 
welfare, the philosophy of Keynsianism views public debt as an additional important 
tool of policy. Since deficit spending of the state is merely the counterpart of private 
sector saving, deficit spending is not some sort of financial vacuum that draws 
government revenues into one big financial black hole over time. What government 
deficit spending does is to permit the private sector to achieve its level of desired 
saving over time. Hence, when the latter changes, government spending ought to be 
changing in the opposite direction to offset it (unless the current account balance also 
changes). Indeed, without a rise in overall debt, whether it is public or private, the 
growth process would come to a halt in a credit-driven monetary economy. 
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- The model doesn't distinguish between public consumption and public investment. 
Public investment is actually very productive (Seccareccia, 2011)): in fact, it not just 
stimulates productivity in the specific sector of public investment domain, but it also 
enhances private sector performance. Thus, private capital and public capital are not 
competitive; rather they are complementary, they support each other. 
 
- The model lacks attention to institutions. Douglas North (1989) has argued forcibly 
that the growth of productivity that has occurred since the rise of the West is as much 
attributable to the development of institutions that have allowed us to reduce 
transaction costs and thereby to exploit more fully the potential gains from exchange, 
as it is to increased control over nature. Similarly, Acemoglu and Robinson (2010) 
posit that the main determinant of differences in prosperity across countries are 
differences in economic institutions. 
 
- The model does not require that, in order to undertake innovation, new R&D firms 
need to have developed any particular knowhow. Yet, quality improvements in 
practice may have a major cumulative aspect ("step-by-step innovations"). For 
example, it might be that only R&D firms that have already reached a certain level of 
knowledge in a particular product or machine line can engage in further innovations. 
This is in fact consistent with qualitative accounts of technological change and 
competition in specific industries. 
 
- The model supposes that monopoly in the intermediate input sector lasts for one 
period. This restriction doesn't take into account the different speed with which 
radical and incremental innovations tend to occur: while for radical innovations to 
take place a longer time span may be required, incremental innovations are likely to 
follow one another more rapidly. 
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- The model is based on an inverse monotone relation between the wage rate and the 
labour employed. In the 60s and 70s the economists of the "heterodox Cambridge" 
(Sraffa, Pasinetti, Garegnani, Spaventa), in contraposition to the representatives of 
the "orthodox Cambridge" (Samuelson, Levhari), showed that such a relation results 
from the unrealistic assumption of a unique final good. Conversely, in an economy 
with multiple goods the relation between the wage rate and the labour employed is 
undetermined 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The Schumpeterian model constitutes a step forward in the understanding of actual tax 
dynamics. By introducing innovation-based growth, the long-run optimal tax rate on 
capital income ceases to be zero. This departure from the Chamley-Judd prescription 
reflects two effects: first, a market power effect driven by the monopoly distortion 
associated with endogenous innovation; second, a market size effect which relates the 
equilibrium rate of innovation to the equilibrium level of aggregate final output. For a 
low share of public spending in total GDP, a low level of income tax evasion, a low 
elasticity of labour supply or a low share of capital income in total GDP, the market 
size effect pushes towards taxing labour income while subsidizing capital: in fact, when 
one of these conditions is verified, the distorsive impact of the wage income tax on 
hours worked is smaller than the distorsive impact of the capital income tax on 
aggregate savings. Conversely, for a high share of public spending in total GDP, a high 
level of income tax evasion, a high elasticity of labour supply or a high share of capital 
income in total GDP, the market size effect pushes towards taxing capital income in 
order to spare labour income and thereby preserve labour supply: in fact, given one of 
the aforementioned premises, the distorsive impact of the wage income tax on hours 
worked is larger than the distorsive impact of the capital income tax on aggregate 
savings. 
However, the Schumpeterian model still leaves out important considerations, first among all 
the heterogeneity of economic agents. In the presence of heterogeneous agents, a growth-
maximizing fiscal policy is no longer also a welfare-maximizing fiscal policy. GDP doesn't 
adequately capture distributional problems or whether growth is producing damaging side-
effects that might ultimately reduce societal welfare. Society ought to adjust its policies so 
as to target goals other than just economic growth—that it is appropriate to sacrifice 
performance of the top-line GDP figure for the sake of other goals, like reductions in 
income inequality. The importance of tax equity has long been recognized. Adam Smith 
(1776, Book V, chapter 2) established “four maxims with regard to taxes,” one of which 
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was the need for equality in a tax system. Taxation is not simply a means of financing 
government, but one of the most visible parts of the social contract underlying the state.  
The consequence of ignoring equity issues is the tendency of wealth to grow faster than the 
domestic product (i.e.    ,   = average annual rate of return on capital and   = rate of 
growth of the economy), creating inequality that undermines democracy and social justice. 
 
 
 
As a remedy to such a contradiction of capitalism in the twenty-first century Piketty (2014) 
suggests a utopian, yet intriguing tool: "a progressive global tax on capital, coupled with a 
very high level of international financial transparency. Such a tax would provide a way to 
avoid an endless inegalitarian spiral and to control the worrisome dynamics of global capital 
concentration".     
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